First Reading On motion made and seconded, The Law Practitioners (Disciplinary Proceedings) Bill (No. XXIX of 2025) was read a first time.

Perhaps now we can break for tea. Thank you. At 4.50 p.m., the Sitting was suspended. On resuming at 5.32 p.m. with Madam Speaker in the Chair.

You may be seated! Second reading THE COURTS (AMENDMENT) BILL (NO. XXVIII OF 2025) Order for Second Reading read. (5.32 p.m.) The Attorney General (Mr G.P.C. Glover, SC): Madam Speaker, I beg to move that The Courts (Amendment) Bill (No. XXVIII of 2025) be read a second time.

Yes, please.

Madam Speaker, this Bill amends the Courts Act to simplify and streamline the procedure for an application for a judicial review. Judicial review is one of the cornerstones of the rule of law. It ensures that the decisions of public authorities remain within the bounds of legality, fairness and reasonableness. It is not an appeal on the merits but a review of the decision-making process. This is a common mistake. It enables the citizen to stand up and be counted when his rights are at stake. It gives him the opportunity to access an important judicial process. And because it is so important for the citizen, it became naturally important for us to look at the process to render it more accessible, in line with the commitment of the Government to make justice more accessible to all. Madam Speaker, as you are well aware, the courts do not have the power to second guess administrative decisions and change them because they believe that a different decision ought to have been taken. That would be breaching the separation of powers. Instead, the courts can only check the manner in which a decision has been taken and whether it has indeed been taken in accordance with the principles of fairness, reasonableness, equality and legality. But just as the decision-making process needs to be reasonable, it goes without saying that the review process itself must obey the same imperative. The purpose of this Bill is therefore not to narrow the scope of judicial review, but to make the process by which it is exercised more efficient, more predictable, and more responsive to the needs of the citizens and of the administration alike. The present process for judicial review spans two different stages. The first stage is the application for leave of the court to proceed with the substantial judicial review application. It is only if leave is granted that the citizen will be allowed to proceed further with the second stage of the application. It is thus heavy, cumbersome and costly to the litigant citizen, and as if that were not enough, it often ends because the legal issue at stake is no longer a live issue. That is because the courts are loathe to interfere to stop and stay an administrative decision pending a final decision after the hearings are concluded. For too long, Madam Speaker, the first stage of judicial review - the application for leave - has become a source of delay and uncertainty. Cases have remained pending at the threshold stage for months, even years, before the court not could decide whether the matter should proceed to a full hearing. This defeats the very purpose of judicial review, which is to ensure prompt supervision of administrative action. All this, Madam Speaker, obviously impacts, first and foremost, the citizen who comes to court to obtain justice. Madam Speaker, as far back as 2009, the Law Reform Commission had highlighted in a Discussion Paper that judicial review, being part of the Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, must be reformed to better operate as an effective control over the exercise of public power. The Commission observed that the two-stage procedure - first, leave; then, the substantive hearing - was necessary as a filter against frivolous applications, but that procedural delays risked undermining confidence in the process itself. Over the years, it must be said that the courts have tried to apply these principles. Yet, in practice, the leave stage has become congested. Although applications are filed ex parte, multiple affidavits are sometimes exchanged, and oral arguments are often heard on the same points that will arise again at the merits stage. This duplication consumes judicial time without adding value to justice. The present Bill, therefore, responds precisely to that difficulty. It retains all substantive guarantees of fairness but modernises the procedure. It does so by assigning the leave stage to the Judge in Chambers, imposing clear time limits, and ensuring that once leave is granted, the matter proceeds without the need for a further application which would necessitate the lodging of another motion before the court. Madam Speaker, allow me then to highlight the principal changes in this Bill. First, it inserts an entire new sub-part to the Act titled “Procedure to Apply for Judicial Review.” Clause 3 of the Bill adds new sections 76B to 76J to the Act. Under the new section 76C (1), an application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made to the Judge in Chambers not later than 45 days after the impugned decision. This clarifies the former requirement of “promptness” we inherited from our British colonial masters which was felt inadequate as it was not informative enough and left it to the entire discretion of the court, leading to sometimes seemingly contradictory decisions. The delay of 45 days is not innocuous. It straddles the very limited delay of 21 days for appeals and the 3 months that was erstwhile taken to be the benchmark for delay for applications for judicial review to be initiated; it also follows consultations with the judiciary, in order to allow a realistic opportunity for applicants to prepare their case while still ensuring expedition. The idea here, Madam Speaker, is to allow concerned citizens the time to be informed of a decision affecting them, to retain legal advisers and to prepare properly for a challenge – without extending the period so much that any administrative decision is plagued with uncertainty for months on end. The Judge in Chambers will consider the application inter partes, that is, with notice to the other side, thus enhancing fairness and transparency right from the start. The motion must be supported by affidavit, accompanied by all relevant documents and a statement of case setting out the detailed grounds, the relief sought, and proof of sufficient interest. The requirement for a comprehensive statement discourages speculative filings and focuses the court’s attention on genuine issues of legality in the decision-making process of the public body. The Judge in Chambers shall then determine the application for leave to apply for judicial review on the papers alone, but may, where he deems necessary, request written submissions on any point or, in exceptional circumstances, order an oral hearing in chambers. This approach, Madam Speaker, reflects modern judicial review practice worldwide. It reduces unnecessary hearings while preserving the Judge’s discretion to hear counsel where fairness so requires. Madam Speaker, a binding time limit is being introduced in this Bill. The Judge in Chambers must determine the application for leave to apply for judicial review not later than 60 days after the case is in shape. If that delay is not respected, the matter may be reported to the Chief Justice. This is a major innovation being brought forward by this Government. Earlier this year, in the Criminal Appeal and Criminal Review Act 2025, a time limit for sentencing after conviction was introduced. Similarly, here, the court retains full discretion, but the timeframe serves as an incentive for prompt decision-making, not a deterrent. Madam Speaker, Government intends to broaden the recourse to time limits in the upcoming reforms of the judicial process. The goal is to respond to a pressing demand by the public for judgments to be prompt, because, Madam Speaker, as we all know, justice delayed is justice denied. There is a growing perception in this country that lodging a case in court to defend or vindicate one’s rights is so time consuming that it is often better to let things slide. Or that only those with money and the ability to wait who can afford to go to court. This cannot be allowed to endure. At the same time, Madam Speaker, this Government is acutely aware of the challenges faced by the members of the judiciary and such reforms are not meant to unduly pressure them. Lack of means, personnel and time are not imputable to the honourable and hardworking men and women who sit as magistrates and judges in our Courts. However, there have been and there still are, some cases of exaggerated delay which simply cannot be accounted for. Which brings me, Madam Speaker, to a question that will be hotly debated in the months to come, and as you say yourself, the question will be: is the imposition of time limits on decisions of the judiciary an interference on judicial independence? Would the legislator be overstepping the separation of powers when mandating such provisions? The first element of an answer is that the judicial function does not operate ex nihilo, that is, conjured into existence out of thin air. No, it exists because there is a Constitution. The first element of an answer is that the judicial function does not operate ex nihilo – conjured into existence out of thin air. No, it exists because there is a Constitution and because there are laws that delimit its role, its jurisdiction, its powers and its duties. It would, I submit, Madam Speaker, be therefore absurd to denounce any reform of the legislator that affects the judicial function on the basis of the separation of powers. The real question is whether the content of the reform does indeed curtail the independence of the judiciary? Madam Speaker, here, I believe that an important nuance – often used word these days – is often lost. We tend to deal with the question in terms of absolutes when in fact it is a question of degree. Would a law imposing a time limit of 24 hours on judgments be a breach of judicial independence? I submit yes - of course! Because by forcing Magistrates and Judges to rush through their decisions, one would be curtailing their ability to effectively adjudicate the complex issues before them and expose them to opprobrium or sanctions should they fail to meet this excessively demanding standard. It would be simply unacceptable in a democratic society. On the other hand, would a law imposing a time limit of, say, 12 months on judgments be a similar evil? I think not. Citizens have the right, under section 10 of the Constitution, to judicial decisions being taken within a reasonable time. And, it is not reasonable for someone to have their life, their work, their goals and their means suspended for years waiting for a judgment with no deadline in sight. And yet, Madam Speaker, this is what is happening today in some extreme cases. There are judgments of the Supreme Court which are still awaited after many years! Too many I dare say! These two extreme situations, Madam Speaker, show that a time limit is not in itself a breach of judicial independence or a necessary safeguard for citizens. It all depends on how reasonable the time limit is with regards to the type of case at hand, and therefore whether it does impose undue pressure on the judiciary or whether it simply prevents the most egregious cases of delay. And, this is why the 60-day limit has been chosen here for a determination on the application for leave only. We believe it is reasonable, fair, and strikes a good balance between the independence of the judiciary and the citizens’ rights. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the time limit starts from the day the case is in shape, which means when the Judge in Chambers has heard all parties concerned, and not from the initial day of the application for leave to apply for judicial review was made. Madam Speaker, in this Bill, only one narrow right of appeal is preserved, that of the applicant who may appeal against the refusal of leave, but no appeal shall lie from the decision granting leave. The rationale is very simple. The respondent will have every opportunity to defend the decision at the merits stage. Multiplying interlocutory appeals would only delay justice. Where leave is granted, the application for leave shall stand as the substantive application for judicial review. No new application or filing will be required, and the grounds of review will be limited to those on which leave has been granted. The case will then be listed before at least two Judges of the Supreme Court, including, as far as possible, the Judge who granted leave, for hearing on the merits. This will ensure both continuity and collegiality. Madam Speaker, pending applications will continue under the existing regime, thereby protecting vested procedural rights. Finally, a number of statutes, including the Financial Crimes Commission Act, the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Employment Relations Act, the Bank of Mauritius Act, the Extradition Act, and others, are amended to refer expressly to the new procedure, so that all legislation speak the same language. The reforms, Madam Speaker, thus seeks to assist, not constrain, the Judiciary: to give the Court the procedural tools to deliver justice more swiftly, while maintaining full independence in decision-making. In fact, the judiciary has, in this particular case, Madam Speaker, been amply consulted in the preparation of this Bill and the feedback received on the final version has been positive. For citizens and practitioners, the impact will be tangible. Applicants will know that they must act within 45 days of the decision. Respondents will know when they must reply. And, both sides will know that the Judge in Chambers must decide the leave application within 60 days once the matter is in shape. This will bring certainty, efficiency, and predictability – values that are essential to any modern justice system. It will also relieve the Supreme Court of the backlog that currently accumulates at the leave stage, freeing judges to focus on substantive cases of real importance. The reform will also strengthen the confidence of investors, professionals, and citizens in the administrative justice system. When government decisions can be challenged promptly and fairly, it fosters trust in public institutions and, ultimately, in the rule of law itself. Madam Speaker, Mauritius is not alone in modernising its judicial-review procedure. Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom have all moved towards written, time-bound leave processes. The proposed new Sub-part VIA of the Act is in line with these international best practices, while preserving our own judicial traditions. At a deeper level, Madam Speaker, this Bill reaffirms a fundamental principle: that legality and efficiency must coexist. Justice delayed, in matters of public administration, often means injustice not only to the applicant but also to the wider society, because everyone can be affected by the resulting uncertainty. The Government’s broader programme for justice reform is driven by this same philosophy. We are modernising procedures, clarifying jurisdictions, and making our courts more accessible to citizens. The present amendment is another step in that process. The Courts (Amendment) Bill 2025, Madam Speaker, is thus a useful and practical reform. It modernises an important area of administrative law while preserving every constitutional safeguard. It brings clarity where there was uncertainty, and it introduces discipline without rigidity. Above all, it ensures that the right to challenge unlawful administrative action remains effective, not merely theoretical. Judicial review is, after all, “the protection of the citizen against the abuse of power.” This Bill, Madam Speaker, strengthens that protection by making the process fit for the demands of a modern Mauritius. I therefore commend the Bill to the House. Thank you.

Okay, Mr Seeburn. (5.51 p.m.) Mr M. Seeburn (Second Member for Vieux Grand Port & Rose Belle): Thank you, Madam Speaker. Madam Speaker, I rise today to speak in support of the Courts (Amendment) Bill introduced by the hon. Attorney-General. This is a Bill that embodies our Government’s commitment in modernising and strengthening our judicial system, making it more efficient, accessible and fair to all Mauritians. A Bill that this Government brings forward with clarity, conviction and courage with a purpose of not to narrow the scope of the judicial review but rather to make it more accessible as stated by the Attorney-General in his address to the House earlier. Madam Speaker, our Government’s programme for 2025-2029 clearly prioritises reform of the justice system. We pledge to introduce a Judicial Review Miscellaneous Provisions Bill to simplify procedures and harmonise judicial review across the law under various enactment. During the debate on the Government’s Programme, we reaffirmed that improving judicial efficiency, access and predictability is not just a legal reform but rather a cornerstone of good governance and public trust. Madam Speaker, too often procedural bottlenecks in our courts have caused delays, uncertainty and additional costs. Through this Bill, we aim to improve access to justice and make our legal system more responsive to the needs of citizens and businesses. Madam Speaker, for years we inherited a legal framework where more than 25 statutes referred to judicial review in different styles, different formulations and different procedures. The result of this is it creates confusion, litigation delays, procedural loopholes and also inconsistent remedies depending on which statute one happens to fall under. Madam Speaker, let us be absolutely clear. This Bill is about bringing order, harmonising our justice system and strengthening the supervisory role of the Supreme Court. Madam Speaker, Clause 3 of this Bill brings an essential reform to the way the judicial review applications are handled. It provides that applications for leaves will be disposed of by a Judge in Chambers, a model that enhances both efficiency and fairness. In fact, a Judge in Chambers is already entrusted with urgent and procedural matters and this Bill builds on that expertise by allowing leave applications to be decided on papers. Clause 3 helps to reduce delays, legal costs and unnecessary formalities. At the same time, Madam Speaker, the Bill maintains important safeguards. For instance, where the interest of justice requires it, the Judge may call for an oral hearing. Madam Speaker, crucially, this Bill introduces a 60-day timeframe for the disposal of the leave application. This is reasonable and fair. Bringing predictability and preventing the stagnation of cases, reasons must be given when leave is refused. An applicant retains the right to appeal and this ensures transparency and accountability at every stage. On the other hand, Madam Speaker, if leave is granted, that same application becomes the substantive application eliminating duplication, thus saving time and reducing cost. Madam Speaker, this Bill is clarifying jurisdiction. It is cleaning up inconsistencies, it is removing interpretative ambiguities and ensuring that the Supreme Court is not shackled by outdated drafting from the past century. Madam Speaker, Clause 4 is one of the most significant parts of this Bill. It amends over 25 different enactments and harmonises statutes that govern the health professionals. It governs the financial regulators, trade unions, Mauritius Revenue Authority, Financial Crimes Commission, Financial Intelligence Unit, Financial Services Commission, intellectual property, road traffic. It also governs reals estate agents, national transport, public bodies appeals and even United Nations sanction processes. Madam Speaker, this government is doing something that the opposition never dared to do – that is, establishing one clear unified legal path to the Supreme Court for all judicial review matters. This Bill is ensuring that new leave based judicial review system is aligned across our legal framework. Madam Speaker, these are consequential amendments and not arbitrary changes. The Courts Act is being reformed. All of the statutes that refer to judicial review or similar procedures must be updated so that they refer to the same modern streamlined process. This harmonisation is essential and without it, we risk legal fragmentation, uncertainty and inconsistency in how different public bodies are reviewed by the courts. Madam Speaker, by making judicial review more accessible and predictable, we are lowering the barriers for citizens, businesses and regulated entities to challenge administrative decisions. By requiring leave, we are discouraging frivolous or vexatious applications, protecting judicial resources and ensuring that serious claims are given due attention. This process respects both efficiency and procedural fairness. It is striking a balance between filtering weak cases and preserving rights. Madam Speaker, some may question why Clause 4 amends so many different acts. Let me address that directly because this is necessary. When we reform the Courts Act, procedures for judicial review, we must also bring into line all other laws that rely on or refer to judicial review cases; otherwise, we will have a mismatch. Some laws will refer to all procedures, others to the new, resulting in confusion and inconsistent practice and litigation risk. By amending more than 25 statutes, we are ensuring legal coherence. It is a structural reform giving certainty to courts, litigants, public bodies and regulators. In the long run, this coherence will save judicial time, reduce appeals and foster public confidence in the legitimacy of judicial review cases. Madam Speaker, this is the demonstration of the government’s commitment to justice reform. By making judicial review more effective, we reaffirm that state decisions are subject to accountability and that citizens have meaningful access to legal recourse. The Bill does three things. It is protecting the litigants from uneven procedural treatments. It is protecting the judiciary by giving it a coherent legal architecture. It is protecting the country from legal uncertainty. Madam Speaker, the Bill is reinforcing the judicial review system. It is strengthening the rule of law. it is making our legal system more predictable, more manageable and more accessible. It is the type of reform that a serious and responsible government brings. In fact, this government is delivering modernity and not politics. Madam Speaker, before I conclude, allow me to thank the hon. Attorney General for his continuous significant contribution to our justice system and his team for drafting this progressive piece of legislation that it reinforces our rule of law. We are doing what the previous government never had the courage nor competence to do. This Bill is bringing coherence to our laws, it is strengthening our judiciary and is standardising our access to justice in building a modern legal framework that Mauritius and our people out there deserve. Above all, Madam Speaker, this Bill is a modern, practical and necessary reform. This is how we deliver on our promise for a just, transparent and efficient court system. This Bill deserves the full support of this House. With these words, Madam Speaker, I thank you.

Yes, hon. A. Duval. (6.00 p.m.) Mr A. Duval (Fourth Member for Port Louis North & Montagne Longue): Yes, thank you Madam Speaker. Madam Speaker, the Bill purports to simplify and streamline the procedure for judicial review. But, Madam Speaker, with utmost respect to the hon. Attorney General, I think that this Bill does only half of the reforms that have been long recommended by the Law Reform Commission since 1995, reaffirmed, supported again, faced discussion paper in 2009, that is, that we look at the procedure which this Bill is doing but also, at the substantive part which we are not. The hon. Attorney General’s philosophy has been and rightly so to bring under one umbrella legislation to put order into our legislative frameworks where it is necessary and to bring clarity. He has done it with the Civil Appeal Act, the Criminal Appeal Act being the latest to consolated scattered provisions in a coherent umbrella statute. For judicial review, Madam Speaker, the most perhaps constitutionary significant of all or as constitutionary significant, he does not do so. In fact, he is doing the opposite. He is burdening the old Courts Act with a complex procedural sub-part instead of following the long-held recommendation that we bring one full-fledged statutory legislation for administrative justice; an Administrative Justice Bill that addresses the procedure but also lays down the substantive part judicial review. So, the question, Madam Speaker, first is why has the hon. Attorney General chosen not to follow the recommendation of the Law Reform Commission? Why has he not thought it fit to bring in this Bill today clarity; clarity on the grounds for making a judicial review and on the remedy that may be sought? Given that our judicial review procedure has been based on the English Law Rule 53, Order 53, which has now been itself modernised under the Civil Procedure Rule 54, where we have the right to claim compensatory damages now. The first point, Madam Speaker, with regard to the Bill, which I think the hon. Attorney General should consider, is that of delay. Under the Bill, the aggrieved party has 45 days within the date of the decision of the administrative authority to make his application for judicial review. But the administrative authority itself has no duty to inform the aggrieved party of its decision. Where the aggrieved party makes a request for the reasons for the decision, pursuant to the principle of natural justice, there is no delay to do so under one piece of legislation. Why are we then imposing 45 days down from three months, which used to be the case and which is the case in the UK, when we do not have a said delay for notification of the aggrieved party of the decision of the administrative authority? One recent case which happened under this Government was the demotion of Police Officers, for example, which occurred the day after the general elections. It was effected the day after general elections. They were demoted and transferred, but were only served with their official letter a month after. So, one important amendment is to change the delay not to the date of the decision, but to the date of notification. 45 days from the day the applicant receives his notification. The second, Madam Speaker, is the duty – I said it – on the administrative authority to communicate their decision within a prescribed time and a set delay. We impose a duty on the judge in chambers, we impose a time limit on the Judge in Chambers to dispose of the matter on the first leg, but we do not impose a prescribed time for the administrative authority to either notify or give the reasons for the decision. Madam Speaker, this is more so relevant in the absence of the long-awaited Freedom of Information Act. Therefore, I hope that the hon. Attorney General will see merit in making that small amendment – changing the date of the decision to the date of notification of the decision, which will make a whole difference. If you take the example of the Police Officers who were demoted the day after the general elections, they would have had nearly two weeks to make their application, given that the decision was taken on the next day and notice given to them a month after. The third, Madam Speaker, is the right of appeal, that is, appeal to the Privy Council should be as of right as per the Constitution, either on the first leg or the second leg. Madam Speaker, if you look at the case of the Jacpot Ltd (Appellant) v Gambling Regulatory Authority (Respondent) (Mauritius), you will see that the Privy Council has clarified Section 81 of the Constitution as to who can appeal to the Privy Council on judicial review applications and who can satisfy first, how do we determine the value as set out under Section 81 (1)(b) of the Constitution, of Rs10,000, when, Madam Speaker, you will agree that not all judicial review applications can be valued in terms of monetary means. This what the Privy Council said in the case of Jacpot, which concerned the case of the revocation of a license. It is stated that although the license might generate revenue, would have a value, the right to a license being a discretionary decision of the authority was not a right that the applicant had – a civil right –, but merely, he had the right to be treated fairly when deciding on his application for a license. Therefore, there could be no monetary value attributed to that right. In the case of Jacpot, he failed in the first test of Rs10,000. Then, there is the second which is found under 82 (2)(b), whether it is of general public importance. There again, the application to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not successful because they thought that although that right, important as it is, is a public law right, that is, the right to be treated fairly, it is no different from the right of any person with a relevant interest who has to see the law applied. Therefore, it denied the application. It denied the appeal to the Privy Council. In the case of Jacpot, having failed the monetary test and having failed the general public importance test, it had seen its appeal denied. So, the question is why doesn’t the Attorney General, who is simplifying and streamlining procedure, deem it fit to provide as of right, the right to appeal to the Privy Council, given that in certain cases of judicial review, there are complex issues? Like in the case of Jacpot, there are many other cases that do not, on the face of it, allow an appeal to the Privy Council on a question of judicial review, as in the case of Jacpot, it concerned the granting of license. The same can be said for others who have applied for a job and who have appealed by judicial review. The fourth, Madam Speaker, is the issue of substance as per the Law Reform Commission Paper. I must say that the Law Reform Commission Paper, which is dated in 2009, has given a very streamlined, concise, proposed Administrative Justice Bill stating clearly the grounds for relief. There were a number of grounds: excess of jurisdiction; unauthorised administrative act or omission, which was in anyway unauthorised or contrary to law; breach of principles of natural justice; unjust, unreasonable, irregular, improper exercise of discretion; abuse of power, and fraud by faith. All of those which were to be found under one legislation. As it stands under this Bill, you will find the procedure under the Courts Act. You will have to go to case law for substance. And according to the Supreme Court rules, the law is silent, we will have to go to England. How is that streamlining? How is that not creating more of a mess, in fact? So, The Law Reform Commission had long pondered – 30 years they have been recommending for one umbrella legislation. Madam Speaker, similarly, the remedies which include – I have said it – restitution, compensation or damages in money, which is not permissible at present under our law. The Supreme Court has disallowed claims for compensatory damages in Mauritius although it is the case in England. Yet, the Law Reform Commission has recommended that. And, I would ask the hon. Attorney General why does he not think it important, now, since he is bringing an amendment, since he is attempting to streamline and clarify judicial review, since it is an opportunity for him to come and, once and for all, to bring a modern piece of legislation in line with the best practices that other Commonwealth countries have followed in line with the recommendation of the Law Reform Commission that have long pondered and which is here, why did he not see merit in doing so? So, Madam Speaker, I think it is a missed opportunity to have a comprehensive law on judicial review. I think that we could have followed the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission again when it comes to the duties imposed on local authorities, on administrative authorities. You will see, Madam Speaker, if you look at the Law Reform Commission paper, you would see that, for example, under Section 14 of the draft, you would have a request for reasons, there would be a duty. An applicant, an aggrieved party would be entitled to make a request for reasons to an administrative authority who would have by law the duty, the obligation to reply. It would have by law to provide the statement of reasons within a prescribed delay – 30 days as from the date of the request. Because what is the point of having a delay if the administrative authority can take months and years to furnish a statement of reasons or to furnish his decision in writing. There was the principle of natural justice enshrined in the draft legislation that the law relating to natural justice would apply to any person/body granting, refusing, modifying or revoking any licence, permission, qualification or authority or imposing any penalty under the powers conferred by the enactment. So, this is it, Madam Speaker. I am not inventing anything. It is here. It has been here for 30 years; the hon. Prime Minister was Prime Minister then. He was again Prime Minister when they issued the discussion paper in 2009 and he is now Prime Minister again…

Et il reviendra encore !

(Interruptions)

Ça suffit!

… and yet this Law Reform Commission paper has all but been wasted.

Thank you.

Madam Speaker, to reiterate what we do need now is a stand-alone Administrative Justice Act.

You have said that.

Yes, codified grounds of review.

Do not repeat, do not repeat!

But I am just concluding, codified remedies, statutory duty on administrative authorities to give reasons, statutory timeline imposed on them, a clear right of appeal to the Privy Council and, therefore, a modern administrative justice bill and then, Madam Speaker, I think that the country would be much better. Thank you.

Thank you. Hon. Ms Collet! An hon. Member: Mais, Joe quand même !

Joe tap lamin – bien egois ein !

Qu’est-ce qui se passe là ? Est-ce que l’honorable Ms Collet peut parler ? Elle vous attend la ! Allez-y. (5.53 p.m.) Ms M. R. Collet (First Member for Rodrigues): Merci, Madame la présidente. Aujourd’hui, c’est mardi 25 novembre 2025, personne n’accepte d’injustice et de manque de raison. Alors, les exemples du passé nous rappellent pourquoi cette réforme est indispensable, Madame la présidente. Et nous avons cette demande de refonte du domaine du droit administratif. Nous avons vu des dossiers emblématiques de droit où la clarté des règles s’est perdue dans des délais excessifs. Et il a fallu attendre cinq ans ou plus avant qu’une décision judiciaire ne soit rendue. C’était vu comme normale. Mais nous sommes tous d’accord que ce n’est plus acceptable. Et même à Rodrigues, une région autonome, certaines décisions publiques ont été contestées, mais aboutissant après des années de procès et procédures complexes. Et, il me semble que les lenteurs judiciaires touchent toute la république. Ces affaires ne sont pas des anecdotes, Madame la présidente. Elles sont le miroir d’un système qui laisse trop souvent les citoyens dans l’attente et l’incertitude. Notre justice ne répond plus aux exigences de rapidité, de clarté et de proximité. Mais qu’il soit bien clair, ce n’est pas la faute judiciaire. Nos juges, nos hommes de loi, notre judiciary staff sont des professionnels hautement formés. Ils travaillent avec rigueur et compétence. Ce sont les procédures, trop lourdes et trop anciennes, qui freinent leur efficacité mais ils donnent de leur mieux. Depuis longtemps, nos concitoyens et même nos juges réclament une justice plus rapide, plus simple, plus proche. Nous n’avons pas été sourds à ces réclamations légitimes et raisonnables exprimées à travers la presse écrite et parlée – exprimées dans des débats publics, exprimées dans les attentes quotidiennes de tous. Aujourd’hui, le moment tant attendu est enfin arrivé. Le projet de loi est la réponse directe aux attentes du peuple, des law practitioners ainsi que du judiciaire. J’aborde dans le sens des interventions de l’honorable l’Attorney General et de mon collègue l’honorable Seeburn. Avec votre indulgence, Madame la présidente, je souhaite mettre en contexte projet de loi. C’est un projet qui modifie la Courts Act pour simplifier et rationaliser la procédure de révision judiciaire et non une refonte du fonds du droit administratif qui, je pense, évolue au cas par cas. Ce projet de loi introduit une nouvelle sous partie, Sub-Part VIA, qui encadre clairement les étapes : la demande de leave doit être déposée dans un délai de 45 jours. Elle doit être complète, avec affidavit, pièces justificatives et motifs précis. Le juge en Chambre peut décider d’un stay, c’est-à-dire suspendre la décision administrative contestée. Et le juge doit statuer dans un délai maximum de 60 jours. En cas de refus de leave, un appel est possible devant la cour suprême. Une fois le leave accordé, la demande devient directement une révision judiciaire, et il n’y a plus de doublon. Mais qu’est-ce la justice, Madame la présidente ? La justice, c’est l’équilibre entre les droits et les devoirs. C’est l’institution qui protège le faible face au fort. C’est la garantie que chacun est traité avec équité selon la loi, sans privilège ni discrimination. La justice, c’est le socle de notre démocratie et sans justice il n’y a pas de liberté véritable. Sans justice, il n’y a pas de confiance dans l’État. La révision judiciaire est l’outil qui incarne cette justice. Elle ne juge pas si une décision est bonne ou mauvaise mais juge si elle est légale et juste. C’est la garantie que personne n’est au-dessus de la loi ni même l’administration. Je pense que la procédure révisée est maintenant plus cohérente. Quand nous parlons d’administration, nous parlons de tous les services publics : ministères, l’Assemblée régionale de Rodrigues qui agit au nom et pour le compte du gouvernement central, les collectivités locales, les établissements publics comme les hôpitaux ou les universités, et même les organismes chargés d’une mission de service public. Tous devront savoir que leurs décisions peuvent être contrôlées vite et efficacement. Ce projet de loi, Madame la présidente, harmonise la révision judiciaire dans toutes les sphères de la vie publique. Il touche la santé, la finance, l’économie, les médias, la propriété intellectuelle, la fiscalité, l’agriculture, le transport, les professions réglementées et même les sanctions internationales. Ainsi, il prévoit, entre autres, que les décisions, par exemple, du Registrar of Companies, du Tribunal de relations de travail, pourront être contestées par révision judiciaire. Les décisions du Financial Crimes Commission, de l’Independent Broadcasting Authority seront désormais révisables. Les professions réglementées – architectes, géomètres, quantity surveyors, vétérinaires – auront accès à la révision judiciaire en cas de refus d’enregistrement et de sanction disciplinaire. Les décisions du Public Bodies Appeal Tribunal de la National Land Transport Authority seront aussi soumises à la révision judiciaire. Enfin, Madame la présidente, ce projet de loi est un signal fort. L’État n’a pas peur d’être contrôlé. Il choisit la transparence. Il choisit l’efficacité. Et il place le citoyen au centre. Ce projet de loi incarne une justice moderne. Une justice de confiance. Une justice au service du peuple. Et, je remercie l’équipe du bureau de l’Attorney General, ainsi que l’Attorney General, pour leur écoute et réactivité aux défis du monde moderne dans notre république. Je soutiens ce projet de loi. Je vous remercie, Madame la présidente.

Merci beaucoup. Short, nice and sweet. Thank you. Hon. Pentiah! May I just ask if I am mistaken? I heard something about the date of notification and the date when the decision is taken. Even under this law, the date of notification counts. Just to make things clear.

Madam…

Even the 21 days.

Yes, Madam Speaker, I thought it was obvious to everyone…

Of course.

…but it seems that it is not obvious. So, we will address the issue later on.

Yes, I have been in PBAT for 10 years, so I know. Hon. Pentiah!

But your point is to clarify it. Make it obvious!

Mais, c’est clair…

That is the point!

C’est évident. C’est déjà la loi. (6.24 p.m.)

Madam Speaker, I was going to say at the very outset – with your permission – that I was blessed that both Members of the Opposition were present for a change, then one just walks out. But then again, I am honoured to have at least one Member of the Opposition at this hour of work, still in the House.

Get on with your speech!

Madam Speaker, to address two things; concerning the notification, the Attorney General will duly address but concerning clarity on grounds and clarity on remedy, two issues raised during the intervention of the hon. Member of the Opposition. Well, grounds and remedy are clear for judicial review. This is the ABC of law of judicial review. And, Madam Speaker, shall I start? I start my intervention with a quote from Montesquieu, the architect of the doctrine of separation of powers who wrote in The Spirit of Laws, and I quote – “There is no crueller tyranny than that which is perpetuated under the shield of the law and in the name of justice.” Madam Speaker, these powerful words capture the very spirit of what we are debating today. Already, the 28th Bill of this year. This Bill is about preserving one of the most fundamental pillars of our democracy, the right of every citizen of this country to challenge, by way of judicial review, the decisions of the Executive and our public authorities. Indeed, judicial review is the living expression of Montesquieu’s doctrine of separation of powers. It is the means through which the Judiciary ensures that the Executive remains within the parameters of the law and the decisions taken by those in power are lawful, reasonable and fair. Madam Speaker, this Bill is a safeguard that ensures that power does not turn into tyranny, that authorities excise with accountability and that justice remains within the reach of the people to seek redress where applicable. Our Constitution enshrines this safeguard first and foremost in clear and noble terms. Section 3 guarantees to every citizen the protection of the law, a phrase that has long been interpreted by our Courts to include the right to seek justice and to challenge unlawful administrative action. Section 17 of our Constitution provides that when a person alleges that his fundamental rights have been, are being or are likely to be contravened, he may apply directly to the Supreme Court for redress. Section 17(2) of our Constitution vests the Supreme Court with the jurisdiction to make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate, including the very prerogative remedies that form the heart of judicial review, such as certiorari, mandamus prohibition or declaration. These provisions together give life to the principle that justice must always remain accessible, enforceable and impartial. Judicial review, Madam Speaker, is therefore not a mere procedural tool. It is also a constitutional right guaranteed to every Mauritian. History has shown, Madam Speaker, that whenever the Executive acts without proper checks and balances, the rule of law is fettered and public confidence in institutions erode. The previous government, having sown the seeds of unfairness and disregard for due process, tasted the bitter taste of the fruit of their own poison at the last general elections. That is why this amendment to streamline the judicial review process assumes all its importance. It ensures that the mistakes of the past cannot be repeated, that power is subject to the discipline of law and that fairness and accountability are restored at the heart of governance. The Executive must govern, yes, but it must do so within the limits of law and under the scrutiny of justice. The previous government on too many occasions acted in ways that defied the principles of fairness, procedural propriety and impartiality. Appointments and promotions were influenced, disciplinary actions were taken without the right to be heard and decisions were marked by bias and procedural irregularities. Many of these were decisions amenable to judicial review but the reality is that for many citizens, that route was simply out of reach; not because justice was unavailable but because it was unaffordable, intimidating and painfully slow. As Minister of the Public Service and Administrative Reforms, I have met countless officers who have suffered in silence, dedicated men and women who are unfairly bypassed for appointment or promotion, officers who met every qualification, who have the experience, the dedication and the integrity, yet were overlooked without explanation. When asked, very often the reply was ‘I could not afford it’, some even silently added ‘I was afraid of retribution by the tyranny of those in power’. Madam Speaker, ‘time is money’. This adage could not be truer than in this context. The longer the process, the higher the cost, to such an extent that judicial review runs the risk to be the privilege of the few when it should be a right of all. I have even known cases where public officers who had the courage to bring the cases to Court, saw their proceedings dragged on for so long that they retired before judgement was delivered and in some tragic instances, they passed away before justice could be served. Those cases were struck off as no longer live matters but, Madam Speaker, for the victims and their families, the injustice lives on. It is therefore with deep satisfaction that I welcome the Courts (Amendment) Bill (No. XXVIII of 2025) brought before this House by the Attorney General. This Bill is a turning point, it brings long awaited reform to the judicial review process, a reform that will make the system faster, simpler and fairer. For many of our citizens, including public officers, there is now light at the end of the tunnel. Judicial review will no longer be the privilege of the few but a right within the reach of all. The problem we are addressing through this Bill is well known. The current process of judicial review has become too lengthy, too costly and often not accessible. What we endeavour as a responsible government and what this Bill delivers is a streamlined process that reduces time and cost, simplifies access and ensures that citizens can challenge unfair administrative decisions without being overwhelmed by complexity or delay. The first stage – the test of arguability, where the court decides whether the applicant has an arguable case with a little prospect of success. The second stage, that is, the substantive hearing where the case is fully heard and court decides whether the public body acted lawfully, fairly and rationally. Madam Speaker, in practice, as we have said, the first stage has become unnecessarily complicated. Hearings are often conducted in open court, oral submissions are made, affidavits are exchanged, and most cases, two or more judges sit to deliver a written judgement, sometimes many months later at the very first leave stage. This is time consuming. This is costly and contrary to the very purpose of the leave stage which is meant only as a preliminary filter. As noted in the case of Mohit v. The Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius (Mauritius) [2006] UKPC 20 and echoed in several Supreme Court judgments, the leave stage should be determined on a cursory glance at the material to decide whether there is an arguable case. Yet, the leave stage has become a trial before a trial. A trial before the trial. That is what this Bill seeks to correct. Under the new part Sub-Part VIA of the Courts Act, the judicial review process will now be modern, efficient, accessible – (i) the time limit from 90 days to 45 days, encouraging prompt action and certainty; (ii) the Judge in Chambers will determine the application inter partes on the papers alone, without open court hearings, except in exceptional circumstances. Here, again, the discretion of the court is preserved; (iii) the Judge must deliver a decision within 60 days, bringing long-awaited timeliness to the process; (iv) where leave is granted, the same application stands at the substantive hearing, avoiding duplication and saving time; (v) where leave is refused, an appeal can now be made to the Supreme Court under the Civil Appeal Act 2025 instead to the Privy Council. Perhaps, the hon. Member of the Opposition should have read this part instead of proposing that we should go to the Privy Council. Madam Speaker, these reforms transform judicial review from a distinct costly procedure into a fair, efficient and accessible remedy for the people. With this Bill, Mauritius stands alongside many other jurisdictions, embracing a modern and citizen-centred model of administrative justice. The Courts (Amendment) Bill 2025 is more than a judicial reform. It is a reaffirmation of our constitutional values of fairness and accountability, of reaffirming that this is a land where the rule of law prevails. This Bill says to every Mauritian that justice will no longer depend on wealth or endurance. It will depend on right and reason. With this Bill, the Government is making justice affordable, swift and fair. We are ensuring that those aggrieved by decisions of public bodies suffer the least possible prejudice. We are fulfilling our solemn duty as a caring and responsible government that justice must not only be done – as rightly said by the Attorney General –, it must be seen to be done. At the pace at which our justice system is being reformed, I have no doubt, Madam Speaker, that Mauritius will soon stand as a model of democracy; a nation where the rule of law will again prevail, where justice is within the reach of every citizen and where our democratic values are not merely proclaimed, but lived. Madam Speaker, I shall conclude with the very words of Lord Denning, affectionately remembered as the people’s judge. He propounded, ‘If the citizen is to have confidence in the law, he must be able to challenge the acts of the Executive without fear or excessive cost. Justice must be open to all.’ Madam Speaker, this is a promise of this Government. This is a path to a fairer Mauritius. With these words, I commend the Bill to the House. Thank you.

Yes, hon. Minister of Labour! (6.40 p.m.)

Madam Speaker, the Bill before this House is part of a series of Bills that have been introduced in Parliament since the beginning of the year to improve access to justice and ensure a speedier and more effective dispute resolution mechanism. This is in line with the Government’s commitment, as announced in the Presidential Address earlier in January, to introduce reforms to ensure that the judicial and legal system operate more efficiently, swiftly, fairly and make justice more accessible. I am not going to set out the long list of amendments that have been brought to various legislations, ranging from the Financial Crimes Commission through the new Revenue Tribunal Act and amendments to the Criminal Appeal and Criminal Review Act and the Civil Appeal Act. Suffice it to say, Madam Speaker, I would like to put on record the brilliant work done by the hon. Attorney General and his team at the State Law Office to pilot these reforms. As a leading senior counsel, the hon. Attorney General has first-hand experience of the hurdles and procedural rigidities which all too often result in lengthy and costly proceedings, abuse of process and denial of justice. Madam Speaker, the object of this Bill is to simplify and streamline the procedure for an application for judicial review. As has been aptly stated by the hon. Attorney General, judicial review is the fundamental means by which the Judiciary calls the Executive and the public bodies to account, and make sure that they exercise their authority within the limit of the powers and remain accountable under the rule of law. Judicial review is an important component of the check and balances enshrined in our Constitution. For example, if a citizen has applied for a licence and has not received his licence, usually, he will go by way of judicial review to review the decision of the Minister. Similarly, if he has been denied a licence by the local authorities, he would usually go by way of judicial review. For certain appointments by the Local Government Service Commission and PSC, again, the remedy would be to go by way of judicial review. Now, I am very surprised by what hon. Adrien Duval stated. He started by stating that the hon. Attorney General missed an opportunity to review the substantive law, and he relies on the Law Reform Commission. I have had a quick glance at the Law Reform Commission’s discussion paper on judicial review, published in November 2009, which annexes a draft Administrative Justice Bill which was borrowed from the Barbados Administrative Justice Bill. I have gone through the grounds which is set out in section 5 of that draft Bill and I am sorry but all of the grounds that are set out in that Act is already grounds for asking a judicial review to the court.

Exactly!

So, the Act only codified what exist in our law. So, what is the point of putting restrictions on the judiciary for grounds under which they can review an administrative decision, because there may be in the future other grounds that may be developed through judicial pronouncements? So, I don’t think that there is any reason why this legislation should curtail the right of the judiciary when it comes to the grounds on which to review administrative decision. Similarly, when I look at the remedies provided in that draft legislation, these are already remedies that are applied consistently by the courts in Mauritius. Now, the only nuance on what hon. Adrien Duval stated is about damages, but again, damages in exceptional circumstances is awarded in England and, I am sure, in cases which befit it – an award of damages which is quite exceptional because judicial review by its nature itself concerns the review of the decision-making process as opposed to the decision itself. So, it will be extremely rare that in a case of judicial review, the court would award a monetary compensation. But what I found even more shocking is that the hon. Member, who chose not to be present when we reply to his address, started by saying that the hon. Attorney-General adopted to, and I quote – “A complex procedural system.” In fact, it is the complete opposite, Madam Speaker. This Bill is going to substantially simplify matters as when it comes to judicial review. As the Attorney-General mentioned, we have two steps when it comes to judicial review. First, the citizen, the aggrieved party must apply for leave to bring judicial review, this is the first stage, the leave stage. Then, once he has been granted the leave, he goes to the second stage, which is the main part of the judicial review, where the decision on the merit is considered and determined. Now, there is a fair amount of confusion as to what happens at leave stage. At leave stage, what should really happen is that the court should only determine on a quick perusal of the material available, if there is an arguable case with a realistic prospect of success – a very low threshold. At the leave stage, the court may dismiss applications which are frivolous, vexatious or hopeless. So, at leave stage, the role of the judiciary is to act as a filter and throw away all those unmeritorious cases, ex-facie the evidence produced. Now, what happen in reality, in practice? Unfortunately, depending on the lawyers, there are extensive exchanges of affidavits and counter-affidavits and preliminary point and objection and just at the leave stage, the procedure drags on for weeks and for weeks and this result necessary in denial of justice. So, what is the Attorney-General doing with this Bill? First of all, the procedure before leave, at the moment we have to go before two judges and that takes time. This is being replaced: leave stage – you go to a judge in Chambers. Judge in Chambers usually have jurisdiction when you have to expedite matters; when there are matters which call for prompt decision, you go to a judge in Chambers and obviously, it is easier for a judge, sitting alone, to decide on an application than two judges sitting in an open court. Second procedure that is being simplified. Everything has to be in your affidavit, in your written material in front of the judge in Chambers. Exceptionally, the judge can ask for written submission and even more exceptionally, he can ask for oral submission. So, in practice, this is bound to be a speedier process than it is today. But to ensure that it is the speedier process, the hon. Attorney-General has inserted a clause which imposes a time limit within which the honourable judge must give his determination, and that is 60 days from the close of pleading, from the close of the hearing, if there is a hearing. And, the Bill goes even further and you can even complain to the Chief Justice if the judge in Chamber misses that first 60 days delay. A second way where we are simplifying the system and bringing certainty is the delay within which you can apply for judicial review. And, here I completely don’t connect with the hon. Member who is a barrister. So, he is supposed to know the law. I can understand many Members here who are not well versed in law who can maybe make a comment as stupid as saying that the time limit to bring judicial proceeding is three months and now you read it, you are reducing it to only 45 days. But there is a long list of cases, Madam Speaker, where the court has systematically held that the three months’ delay is not the applicable criteria. Applicable criteria is promptness. You need to promptly bring an application for judicial review and this is where we have a problem because the courts are inconsistent when it comes to determining what amounts to promptness. Is it six weeks? Is it a month? Is it two months? Is it 21 days? There has been consistently contradictory judgement and not only at the level of the Supreme Court but all the way to the Privy Council. And in the Privy Council and at least two decisions, the law lords restated the rule. The rule is that you have to bring judicial review as promptly as possible and what is prompt will depend on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts and depending on the explanation given by the applicant for the delay, if any, to bring proceedings. Now, what we are doing today is removing this uncertainty as to what amounts to promptness. We are staying in the law – 45 days, that’s it. Now there is certainty, everybody knows that you have to apply for judicial review within 45 days of a decision. And what are we doing? In section 4, we are amending all the laws, a series of laws, which had contradictory delays for applying for judicial review. There are some decisions which requires you to do judicial review within 21 days. There are some statutes which requires judicial review to be lodged within 28 days. There are some statutes which does not even provide a statutory timeframe; it just tells you that you can appeal by way of judicial review against the administrative decision. So, now we are bringing certainty. Whether it is an appeal against a decision of the Public Bodies Appeal Tribunal, whether it is the appeal against a decision of the Mauritian Revenue Authority, all appeals by way of judicial review to date will have to lodged within 45 days. Now, how can that be a problem? How can that be disputed? How can that be creating uncertainty or penalising the applicant? So, that is why I simply cannot understand a barrister telling you that when you produce certainty by giving a timeframe, this will necessarily be something bad. The 60-day delay, why is it important? It is important, Madam Speaker, because I will give you an example of a case for which the judgement has just been given this year and that relates to a lecturer who had decided to appeal against decision of the University of Mauritius. In that case, the application for leave for judicial review was lodged in February 2018. Judgement, on leave stage, – I am not talking about the second stage but on leave stage – was delivered on the 09 September 2025, two months ago, that is, seven years. And by the time, the judges gave their decisions, there was no live issue. There was no live issue because the poor applicant had retired and the question of giving him a promotion was no longer a live issue. So, this is the type of abuse that we are trying to meet today by bringing this time limit of 60 days in order for judges to give their decision. The other very important amendment that is being brought, Madam Speaker, is the new section 76(h) which deals with the second leg. Now, as the law stands today, after having gone through the process of leave, after having obtained leave, you have to start from scratch again. The applicant has to swear a new affidavit, annex new series of documents and produce it. Sometimes, you have boxes of pleadings that are being thrown to the judges, duplicity in materials. So, now what we are saying is that in this new law, if the Judge in Chambers ex facie of the pleadings, sees that you have a good arguable case that deserve to go to the next stage, you don’t need to file a new set of affidavits. This affidavit, these documents that are being filed to the Judge in Chambers in the first instance, in the next stage, this would be the basis for the second stage; for the stage where the judges will consider the application on the merit. And, again, I don’t understand the hon. Member. He says that we should have put the right to appeal to the Privy Council. This is why we have the decision held by two judges so that precisely you can apply to the judicial committee of the Privy Council. And he thinks that it is not as of right. Let me just read the first sentence of the judgment in the case of C- Care in which my learned friend appeared. C-Care against the Employment Relations Tribunal – “This is an appeal as of right from a decision of the Supreme Court of Mauritius, which refused the appellant leave to apply for judicial review …” So, what is he talking about? It is already in the law and in any event, the judicial committee of the Privy Council always have the discretion to entertain an application to be heard before him even if the Supreme Court has denied the applicant the right to appeal to the Privy Council. Madam Speaker, the other thing he mentioned is that we need to bring a law so that all administrative bodies are bound to give reasons of their decisions. Again, as a lawyer, he ought to know if a person is aggrieved because he had a legitimate expectation to be informed of a decision, he had a legitimate expectation to be consulted or if a public body has abused his right or has acted abusively abus de droit, these are grounds for judicial review. You don’t have to set it out in the law; already it is a ground to apply for judicial review. So, there is absolutely no reason to go and amend all possible legislations and say that an administrative body has to give a decision every time he is required to make a decision. We all know it is already in the Civil Code. Whenever a body/an authority is given a discretion, they need to exercise this discretion in good faith. It is already in the law. There is no need to change the law. So, Madam Speaker, I hope I have replied to the various grounds raised by the hon. Member. I once again congratulate the hon. Attorney General and his team at the State Law Office to bring this piece of legislation which no doubt, is going to simplify the application for judicial review and ensure a speedier resolution of dispute. Thank you, Madam Speaker.

Thank you, hon. Minister. Your winding up speech, hon. Attorney General. (6.59 p.m.)

Madam Speaker, I was just wondering when my learned colleagues were actually making reference to the other side of the House, that I am becoming very adept and almost a champion now at shadow boxing because I do not have an opponent to face me when he needs to face me. I am very grateful to the hon. Uteem for his extremely comprehensive tutorial on the law. I have not had the time to do it in my speech and he has done it as he usually does. I am also very grateful to hon. Seeburn, hon. Ms. Collet and hon. Pentiah for their speeches on this Bill. Now, since hon. Uteem has been complete in his address to the House, let me just address a couple of matters that really defeat completely my comprehension and understanding of the law. It is absolutely true and certain that my aim, the aim of this new Bill was not to change the substance of the law relating to judicial review. Mr A. Duval, the hon. Member, is right to say that I have not done so and I restricted my intervention to the procedural aspects for one very good reason which was touched upon by hon. Ms Collet in her speech. The aim was to amend the processes so that we address the very immediate problem which is delay and accessibility. C’est un choix délibéré. C’est une simplification et non une refonte. Now, the point that hon. A. Duval makes in relation to the notification issue which brought a wry smile to your face, Madam Speaker, is again because he has failed to read everything in the Bill. If he had gone to Clause 4 (Consequential amendments), and the various acts of Parliament which are being amended to put them in line with what we propose in this amendment to the Courts Act, he would have seen that in every single sub-part of Clause 4, (1) (2) (3) (4) and following, that the words used in the enabling legislation which gave the right to the public body to take the decision – let’s take the first one which is the Allied Health Professionals Council Act where is said that it is amended by repealing section 37 replacing by the following section – “Review of decision of Council – A person who is aggrieved by a decision of the Council.” Now, how can you be aggrieved if you do not know of the decision? If one goes to the next one which is the Bank of Mauritius Act, how can you say that you are dissatisfied with the determination of the review panel if you are not aware of the decision of the review panel? I can go on and on for another 30 minutes but I am obviously not going to bore this House with more nonsensical matters. Now, hon. Uteem has also delved on the 45 days issue, and I said it in my speech and I repeat it so that it is very clear. There have been many decisions deciding on what is an application which has been done with the promptness required by the law. Some legislations provide for 21 days, some 28 days but some do not provide it and in the C-Care case, referred to earlier on, 42 days was decided not be prompt enough. And when we know that erstwhile, in the old days, three months was kind of the yardstick, it was decided and I said it in my speech that 45 days would be as one can say we middle the diddle. We go for 45 days which is half of three months so that we give ample time to the persons dissatisfied with a decision to start judicial review proceedings. Now, Madam Speaker, building a bridge to the future, which is the aim of this Government, means to pause and reassess the workings of our institutions with clarity and honesty. We must ask ourselves whether they still serve the public with the efficiency, fairness and transparency that a mature democracy requires. The reform before us, though technical in appearance, touches on principles that define who we are as a nation. This Bill does not touch the substance of judicial oversight developed by our case law over decades. Instead, it simply modernises the procedure through which that oversight is exercised. These reforms do not encroach upon judicial independence; they reinforce it by giving the courts the procedural structure they themselves have long called for. They reduce unnecessary formalism and allow judges and allow judges to devote their time to what truly matters – the substance of the challenge. Finally, Madam Speaker, this Bill, in fact, restores trust in the system. It protects both the individual and the administration by ensuring that legality is determined without unnecessary delay. It reaffirms that in Mauritius, the rule of law is not an abstract idea, but a living principle. With these words, I commend the Bill to the House. Question put and agreed to. Bill read a second time and committed. COMMITTEE STAGE (Madam Speaker in the Chair) The Courts (Amendment) Bill (No. XXVIII of 2025) was considered and agreed to. On the Assembly resuming with Madam Speaker in the Chair, Madam Speaker reported accordingly. Third Reading On motion made and seconded, the Courts (Amendment) Bill (No. XXVIII of 2025) was read the third time and passed.